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News from the Front!

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IN THIS ISSUE!

Light-Army Aviation at the JRTC: Do We Perform Search and Attack?

by LTC David L. Lawrence, Senior Aviation Observer Controller, JRTC, and CPT John C. White, Military Analyst, CALL

Search and Attack is a premier infantry task at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). It also proves to be Army Aviation's most challenging and futile mission. Piecemeal employment of aviation assets by the brigade combat team, without clear task and purpose, often prohibits *light*-Army Aviation forces from ***Finding*** the enemy; much less contributing to ***Fixing*** and ***Finishing*** the enemy. We in Army aviation rely more on aircraft systems than tactics. This complicates matters as we struggle to define search and attack.

Aviation Doctrinal Base

Aviation doctrine, while giving us the definition of search and attack, does not give a commander a clear task and purpose to the search and attack mission. The first reference to search and attack is found in **FM 1-100*, Aviation Operations:***

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THE EDITORIAL STAFF
***Director, CALL* -**
COL Michael A. Hiemstra
***Managing Editor* - Dr. Lon R. Seglie**
***Editor plus Layout and Design* -**
Mary Sue Winneke

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REPRODUCE AND DISTRIBUTE THIS BULLETIN TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS!

Search and attack operations (a form of movement to contact) are generally conducted by smaller, lighter maneuver forces in densely forested areas to destroy enemy forces; deny area to the enemy; and collect information. They may also conduct search and attack operations –

- **Against a dispersed enemy on close terrain unsuitable for armored forces.**
- **In rear areas against enemy special operation forces.**
- **As area security missions to clear assigned zones.**

Search and attack operations can prevent the enemy from planning, assembling and executing operations on his own initiative.

Most search and attack operations begin without detailed prior information about the enemy. The commander must produce much of his own intelligence as the operations unfold. These operations are conducted at company, battalion and brigade levels with division support. Historically, units conduct search and attack operations –

- **In an environment of friendly air and fire support.**
- **Against squad–to-company-size forces equipped with small arms and mortars, but normally without artillery support.**
- **Against both regular and guerrilla forces whose locations are unknown.**
- **In an environment where the enemy has the advantage of knowing both the terrain and the local population.**

There is a significant risk associated with this mission. If the aviation unit is surprised by a well-prepared, dug-in force, its effectiveness drops drastically; the probability of aircraft losses increases significantly. **--FM 1-100, *Aviation Operations***

As we progress through aviation doctrine, we still cannot find the "how" of search and attack. **FM 1-111, *Aviation Brigade,*** for example, continues to discuss the "why" of search and attack, but does not focus on the "how."

Search and Attack

Attack aviation assets or air cavalry units search for, and attack, specific targets within generally defined search areas. These missions are conducted when the target location is not known but a general vicinity of the target is estimated. Examples of search and attack missions are—

- **Attack helicopters hunting an isolated theater missile launcher—with supporting vehicles—and destroying them.**
- **Air cavalry and light infantry engaging bypassed enemy forces.**
- **Aviation and infantry reacting to a Level III threat that has already landed in our rear area.**

--FM 1-111, *Aviation Brigade*

FM 1-112, *Attack Helicopter Operations,* does not speak to search and attack, and **FM 17-95, *Cavalry,*** only references search and attack as a mission for air cavalry, usually at squadron level.

The aviation doctrinal manuals do not define critical tasks, nor do they assist the Aviation Task Force commander in developing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). The doctrinal manuals do not distinguish search and attack from other forms of aviation maneuver. The final draft of **FM 1-114, *Air Cavalry Squadron and Troop Operations,*** begins to provide the aviation commander with some doctrinal input on how to fight a search and attack mission, and this manual is referenced throughout this article.

Infantry Doctrinal Base

The infantry sees search and attack as a technique to conduct a movement to contact. Movement to contact is an offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact with the enemy. **FM 7-30,** ***Infantry Brigade,*** discusses three distinct techniques for conducting a movement to contact.

- ☞ **The approach march technique.**
- ☞ **The reconnaissance-in-force technique.**
- ☞ **The search-and-attack technique.**

The infantry continues to develop search and attack tactics in **FM 7-20,** ***Light Infantry Battalion,*** and **FM 71-10,** ***Infantry Rifle Company.*** In a search and attack mission, the infantry commander conducts a decentralized movement to contact against enemy forces. The unit operates as coordinated squad- or platoon-sized patrols. The commander uses ***Find-Fix-Finish*** as a method to organize his unit. The purpose of a search and attack is defined as one of more of the following:

- ☞ **Destruction of the enemy.**
- ☞ **Area denial.**
- ☞ **Force protection.**
- ☞ **Information collection.**

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (**CALL**) **Newsletter No. 97-8,** Feb 97, ***Search and Attack,*** gives the infantry three techniques on how to conduct a search and attack.

- ***Decisive Point Technique –*** The infantry commander bases his course of action (COA) on a specific enemy location. This is either a known location or derived from the S2's own pattern analysis. This COA is planned similar to a deliberate attack.

- ***Linear Technique –*** Use this technique when there are strong indications of enemy in a specific area and when the terrain presents linear-type boundaries. This technique is planned similar to a zone reconnaissance.

- ***Independent Squad Technique -*** This technique focuses squads and platoons on *Finding* the enemy, but makes it difficult to mass to *Fix* or *Finish* the enemy once contact is established. This technique is best used when the following conditions apply:
  - ☞ **There is little knowledge of the enemy's location.**
  - ☞ **Enemy forces are unconventional in nature.**
  - ☞ **Enemy operates in small teams using "hit and run" tactics.**
  - ☞ **Enemy conducts operations over a very large area – forcing friendly forces to disperse to locate the enemy, and then mass to destroy the enemy.**

Current JRTC Trends in Search and Attack

At JRTC most *light*-Infantry task forces conduct platoon- and squad-sized search and attack in specified areas dividing the battalion sector. They often resemble an artillery "horse-blanket" graphic used to support quick clearance of fires on a non-linear battlefield. This graphic is basically a collation of areas or "globules" as depicted in Figure 1 on page 5. It clearly defines sector responsibility for the infantry squad or platoon, but further complicates employment for the aviation commander.



Figure 1. Light Infantry Search and Attack Graphic.

The brigade combat team (BCT) subdivides each battalion sector into small, defined areas. Each area is assigned to an infantry company or platoon to *Find-Fix-Finish* the enemy using the search and attack method of movement to contact. Restricting the use of aviation scout weapon teams (SWTs) exclusively to each small area limits the effects of aircraft tactics, optics, and weapons systems. This usually piecemeals the aerial reconnaissance effort, gives the infantry a false sense of close air-ground integration, and fails to maximize reconnaissance forces forward. This polarized employment method prohibits early development of the situation as SWTs and air cavalry platoons are restricted from reconnoitering adjacent areas that will likely subsequently affect infantry in sector. The infantry battalion commander's reconnaissance objective will likely be templated at a decisive point in his sector. If the SWT or Air Cavalry Platoon is focused on his reconnaissance objective, the likelihood of tactical success increases, even though each company or platoon does not have dedicated aviation support in their respective assigned areas of responsibility.

Army Aviation's Role in Search and Attack

The infantry defines search and attack in such detail because it tactically matters. Perhaps therein lies the problem in Army aviation. Is it necessary to perform search and attack as a specialized form of movement to contact? Is zone reconnaissance or movement to contact sufficient for *light*-Army Aviation?

The aviation commander must determine his unit's role in *Finding-Fixing-Finishing* the enemy. According to cavalry and attack doctrine, we *Find* the enemy by performing reconnaissance (area or zone -- usually force-oriented) or movement to contact. We *Fix* the enemy by performing security or hasty attacks to block or restrict movement. We *Finish* the enemy by massing fires while performing hasty and deliberate attacks to destroy enemy forces – either in contact with infantry or as a meeting engagement following our reconnaissance in sector.

The aviation commander and staff can derive critical tasks from these doctrinal missions. They are essential to conducting the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), synchronizing the battle, and achieving air-to-ground integration. Defining the mission is only part of the problem for Army aviation; we must still ensure proper tactical employment on the battlefield.

Army Aviation Finding the Enemy

The most recent final draft of FM 1-114 discusses the *Find* portion of search and attack as follows:

Find

The ***Find*** portion obviously breaks down into a specified type of reconnaissance mission. The specified tasks for the reconnaissance is dependent on the exact size and composition of the current enemy. The reconnaissance is specifically focused on the enemy force location and composition; it is not focused on the destruction of the enemy. Depending on the enemy force, the reconnaissance can be completed by any type of unit that is habitually trained in reconnaissance missions. Stealth of the reconnaissance force is of great importance. If the reconnaissance force is able to locate the enemy force without being detected, it allows the commander time to develop the situation properly with the fixing and the finishing elements.

The BCT commander must develop a strategy to employ limited aviation assets based on tactical objectives. By stating his intent clearly and prioritizing tasks, the aviation commander will ensure the efficient allocation of his forces. If his priority is *Find* the enemy, the staff must develop a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan that is fully integrated with the ground maneuver battalions. Executing the *light*-Aviation mission, either by doctrinal reconnaissance or movement to contact, ensures the infantry battalion zone is completely reconnoitered. Aviation commanders must avoid the urge to merely jump from zone to zone, randomly *"clearing each globule."* Experience at JRTC shows that aviation continuously misses the seams along each zone and fails to reconnoiter adjacent terrain that will affect *light*-Infantry later in the fight.

We tend to focus more on our aircraft systems than aviation tactics. Superior technology is not a stand-alone solution in this situation. This is especially true of Kiowa Warrior crews. Aircrews hovering for long periods of time while manipulating the mast mounted sight are vulnerable to enemy small arms, surface-to-air missiles, and Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) engagements. Likewise, hastily buzzing around the area of operations at high speeds, while avoiding direct engagements from the enemy, render the Kiowa Warrior inadequate in the conduct of reconnaissance. Using proven air cavalry doctrine and TTP, scout-weapons teams or air cavalry platoons will contribute to tactical success.



Conducting zone reconnaissance in support of the infantry battalion in sector is one such proven doctrinal mission that effectively supports search and attack. A zone reconnaissance gathers detailed information within specified boundaries when the enemy situation is in doubt. Lateral boundaries, a line of departure (LD), and an objective define the zone. If conducted by an air cavalry troop, phase lines are used to synchronize movement between platoons and may be used as a termination point or limit of advance (LOA). Platoons abreast reconnoiter within lateral limits of responsibility that are normally forward extensions of the boundaries of the headquarters assigning the mission. Although a horse-blanket graphic might be employed by the infantry battalion in search and attack, the BCT and maneuver battalion's boundaries would serve to define the zone for the air cavalry troop's reconnaissance. See Figure 2 on page 7.



Figure 2. Aviation Finding the Enemy.

After establishing platoon sectors in zone, the unit designates an LD and a crossing time. The unit conducts force-oriented reconnaissance -- methodically and fully integrated with the ground force, across the depth and breadth of the zone to the LOA. The value of methodical reconnaissance is not always measured in what is observed. Conducting continuous aerial reconnaissance in zone and reporting progress to the infantry battalion commander will also determine where the enemy is not. Thus S2s can predict where the enemy might be. This information is critical to the commander, who can now focus his effort on the S2's *predictive analysis* of where the enemy should be. *Light*-Aviation might rapidly transition from *finding* the enemy to *fixing* by denying access along creek outskirts (in effect, restricting enemy movement to the streams) or screening enemy aviation movements to locate and eventually destroy supply caches and C^2 nodes. In conjunction with the infantry, the combined arms team would subsequently attack to finish the enemy in templated enemy locations based on earlier aerial reconnaissance efforts and predictive intelligence. Specific tasks for *light*-Army Aviation include:

☞ Reconnoiter terrain not easily accessible to ground troops.

☞ Rapidly check key points in zone, locate bypasses around obstacles, provide security on the far side of obstacles while ground troops continue their movement.

☞ Locate and maintain contact with enemy elements before they make contact with the *light*-Infantry in zone.

The aviation commander must further focus his reconnaissance element by including bypass and engagement criteria in his instructions. Failure to do so causes confusion for his troops and platoons following initial contact with the enemy. Furthermore, the result might be an unplanned or undesired branch that completely desynchronizes the BCT plan. Understanding the BCT commander's visualization of the battlefield and decisive point will define the reconnaissance objective.

Clearly stating the *reconnaissance objective* is essential toward shaping the subordinate *light*-Aviation commander's R&S plan. Based on his stated criteria, a hasty attack might be required – or maintaining contact while a ground element maneuvers to contact might be more appropriate.

Army Aviation Fixing the Enemy

FM 1-114 goes on to further discuss the *Fix* portion of search and attack by stating:

Fix

The ***Fix*** portion may be accomplished in a variety of methods. The most common task would be to block an enemy element from moving along his most likely avenue of departure from the area. This task can be accomplished by mounted or dismounted forces, aviation forces, or by mines and obstacles that are covered by fire. The key to the fix portion of the operation is to ensure your fixing unit is appropriate for the type of enemy force in question, and has the capability to react to the enemy in unanticipated locations.

When directed, aviation is capable of *Fixing* the enemy. Consideration must be made toward augmenting aviation with engineers, ground cavalry, or light infantry unless the requirement is to *Fix* by fires. The *light*-Army Aviation commander will select attack-by-fire (ABF) and support-by-fire (SBF) positions to engage the enemy. If well integrated with the ground force, the SBF position will serve as a base of fire or overwatch position to fix the target so the infantry force may maneuver. If assigning this mission to *light*-Army Aviation, expect the enemy to be *fixed* for a short duration because of station time and available ordnance limitations. In many ways, sound tactical employment of Kiowa Warriors and Apaches with their inherent menacing presence on the JRTC battlefield fixes the enemy. OPFOR readily admit that they go to ground when helicopters appear in the vicinity since their number one task is to avoid detection and acquisition.



Figure 3. Aviation Fixing the Enemy.

Army Aviation Finishing the Enemy

FM 1-114 further assists the aviation commander by defining the *Finish* portion of search and attack:

Finish

The ***Finish*** portion may be accomplished by any maneuver force with the combat power to destroy the enemy force in question. The key to success for this portion of the mission is the ability to bring the finishing forces' combat power to bear on the enemy at the key time when he has been located by the finding force, and his egress has been halted by the fixing force.

Finishing the enemy is a task that Army Aviation does well. Following contact with the enemy, the scout element deploys to clear the ABF or SBF position, maintains contact, and conducts a target handover to the attack aircraft. Clearance of fires (direct and indirect) and application of anti-fratricide measures constitutes a challenge in the close fight as hasty attacks are performed in the ground maneuver battalion sector. Aviation elements must ensure that specific coordination is done to ensure accurate friendly location, enemy location, and target marking. Both ground and aviation units must exchange frequencies and call signs to ensure this coordination can be done between the unit in contact and the cavalry or attack helicopters.



Figure 4. Aviation Finishing the Enemy.

The "911" Syndrome

Too often, Army Aviation is diverted from the commander's stated priority (*Find* the enemy) to perform "911" missions that resemble a *hasty* movement to contact against an undetermined enemy in contact with infantry elements. More times than not, the infantry was capable of maneuvering against the enemy but relied on the flexibility and lethality of Army Aviation to influence the outcome. Too often, Army Aviation does not affect the enemy contact or worse yet, since they immediately executed the "911" without any semblance of planning, they are engaged or destroyed upon reaching the target area. When, and if, they continue their previous reconnaissance, the enemy has moved and Army Aviation has once again proven ineffective. How can we avoid this? Designating a quick reaction force (QRF) element (Reserve) whose mission is to conduct a hasty attack provides the infantry with a potent response to a "911" without sacrificing reconnaissance. This further limits the amount of support that can be provided throughout a 24-hour day, but ensures that Army Aviation is focused at the decisive time and place as established by the BCT commander.

Air-to-Ground Integration

While Army Aviation can achieve success conducting unilateral reconnaissance for the BCT, full integration with the ground maneuver battalion must eventually be achieved, especially to *Fix* or *Finish* the enemy. *Light*-Aviation is capable of securing the route. It can provide reaction time and maneuver space by assuming a moving screen along the flank of the infantry battalion as it moves to mass and finish the enemy. The infantry battalion commander might issue the following instructions:

"Your zone reconnaissance must be continuous through nightfall, when I expect the enemy to go to ground. I want you to assume a screen to prevent enemy detection and interdiction of our movement to attack positions. I am most concerned about our chosen route – we are vulnerable while on the march. If you detect the enemy reconnaissance element forward of PL Red, I want you to destroy it. However, this hasty attack is a secondary task – your mission is to secure our movement."

This graduate level of air-ground integration requires a common visualization of the battlefield, capitalization on *light*-Aviation capabilities, and a clearly stated task and purpose by the BCT commander and staff.

Achieving air-ground integration, aimed in concert against an enemy's scheme of maneuver, requires the BCT to maximize the capabilities of all tactical elements. It is largely a function of the professional relationship achieved by the aviation commander and staff with the BCT. The aviation commander cannot depend on his liaison team at brigade to perform all the staff functions required to achieve tactical success against a world-class enemy. COA development, wargaming, and targeting must be synchronized with the BCT. The BCT's R&S plan must be further refined and fighter management cycles adjusted to accomplish the mission according to the IPB and predictive intelligence. Frequent cross-talking with adjacent ground maneuver battalions assures an accurate read on the enemy as well as current locations of friendly forces.

Allocation of aviation forces is a function of priorities and missions. Hasty attacks and reconnaissance both require massing of aviation – massing of direct fires or maximizing reconnaissance elements forward. It is highly likely, if applying combat power according to the BCT commander's intent and based on the IPB, there will be periods of non-coverage by Army aviation. This becomes manageable risk if portrayed early, and in doctrinal terminology to the BCT commander. Too often, this information is withheld or neglected until too late – when the enemy tells on us! Unless the commander is willing to accept this risk, Army Aviation will piecemeal into the fight.

Command Relationships

Air-ground integration is also shaped by the designated command relationship. Avoid accepting command relationships such as "working for," "in support of," or "direct support" – these will not play out well once the fight starts. Use of doctrinal relationships will shape the aviation staff effort and ensure the aviation maneuver element performs its tasks properly. Consider tactical control (TACON) depending on the length of the mission or the amount of flexibility desired to be retained at either the BCT or aviation commander-level. Rarely do Army Aviation units conduct the required tasks to achieve a true operational control (OPCON) command relationship. Time usually does not permit physical, face-to-face coordination, joint planning, or timely exchange of graphics. TACON does not diminish integration with the ground force or the amount of control maintained by the maneuver commander. A robust liaison team at the BCT TOC, although not a substitute for the MDMP performed by the aviation battalion staff, is a tremendous boost to attaining effective air-ground integration. Consider the tactical experience, grade, and maturity of the officers and NCOs selected since they will not only influence the BCT MDMP but will also affect the timeliness and quality of information received by the Aviation Task Force. Designate one officer as the liaison OIC, someone who knows the aviation commander's expectations and is prepared to derive the minimal stated information required for the aviation staff to commence planning. Keeping the aviation commander and staff informed ensures they maintain a meaningful presence at the brigade TOC.

Aviation Organization

Light-Army Aviation success in the search and attack under command and control of the Aviation Task Force is further frustrated by the stove-pipe organizational structure of our battalions. Assault battalions are not trained or manned to perform attack and cavalry missions. The same is true of our attack and cavalry organizations. They exhibit considerable difficulty performing air assaults and logistics movements. Aviation brigade commanders must frequently train the battalions/squadrons as Task Force maneuver organizations. Augmentation with Fire Support Element, Air Liaison Officer, Engineer Officer, Air Defense Officer, and other special staff officers normally found at brigade level will ensure the *light*-Aviation Battalion (Squadron) Task Force has the requisite specialized staff personnel to perform maneuver missions at JRTC. Furthermore, aviation brigade commanders must consider the necessary augmentation required for planning and executing the non-organic missions that must be performed as a task force. The staff must be robust enough to perform the MDMP for current and future operations: reconnaissance, attack, and assault.

Conclusion

Army Aviation is essential to the *light*-Infantry fight. However, we must decide for ourselves HOW we conduct Search and Attack. Given that we already fight in small units at JRTC (platoon and company/troop), is it necessary to further define search and attack? Perhaps our only doctrinal problem is that we have not stated that search and attack is nothing more than zone reconnaissance (force-oriented) or a movement to contact, security, and hasty attack.

Perhaps it is that simple. If we can derive critical tasks from these doctrinal missions, then we will ensure we do not "clear globules" in a methodology that, al though it works quite well for light infantry, results in Army Aviation failing to reconnoiter the seams and adjacent terrain.

The challenge for Army Aviation is to train search and attack by employing action drills that ensure flexibility and lethality without sacrificing the reconnaissance objective. The challenge for the BCT commander is to avoid the urge to piecemeal his aviation forces, instead requiring the aviation commander to accomplish doctrinal reconnaissance and security missions according to stated intent and prioritization of effort. He must be willing to accept that aviation might not be available 24 hours a day, that he might have to accept manageable risk to achieve his stated intent for *light*-Army Aviation in the search and attack.✪

TEACH, COACH and MENTOR



by MSG Daniel W. Feazelle, Battalion Sergeant Major,
1-174th Infantry Brigade (First Army Unit at Fort Drum, NY)

As the Battalion Sergeant Major of 1-174th IN BDE, a congressionally mandated Training Support Twenty One (XXI) program (popularly known as AC/RC), I am the principal trainer of the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who perform the duties of Observer/Controller-Trainers (O/C-Ts) for the Enhanced Brigade and other units in our area of responsibility. This is no easy feat given the limited doctrine on the responsibilities of the O/C-T.

The 1-174th O/C-Ts walk a fine line each time they train with units of the Enhanced Infantry Brigades in 1st Army. The O/C-Ts are the principal evaluators and the most visible representatives of the active component for the enhanced brigades during lanes training, pre- and post-mobilization training, validation, and any other Unit Mission Training Support (UMTS) conducted throughout the year. Since Army National Guard (ARNG) units only have 39 days each year to train, there is no room for error in our approach to teaching, coaching, and mentoring outstanding soldiers.

This article discusses the 1-174th's method of training the O/C-Ts for their difficult, but enormously rewarding, mission. To accomplish this, the mission of the 1-174th and the commander's intent and training strategy must first be clearly understood. Second, the roles and responsibilities of the O/C-T must be identified. Finally, the 1-174th's O/C-T Certification Program provides the framework for the battalion's program to train the O/C-Ts.

MISSION

The 1-174th Infantry Brigade executes lane training, Situational Training Exercises (STXs), and UMTS at selected Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT) sites to increase Force Support Package, Enhanced Brigade, Latest Arrival Date Less Than 30 Forces (LAD <30) and other designated units pre-mobilization training readiness. On order, the 1-174th conducts post-mobilization training for selected Reserve Component units, and provides augmentation to Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) in support of the Federal Response Team.

COMMANDER'S INTENT

The 1-174th Infantry Brigade will execute lanes, STXs, UMTS and after-action reviews (AARs) that measurably increase client unit combat readiness.

KEY O/C-T TASKS:

➤ **Plan, observe, control, and execute lane and STX training.**
➤ **Complete comprehensive AARs and provide feedback that enhance the unit's ability to master and sustain proficiency in their pre-mobilization sets and provide an added value to the unit.** As required, provide feedback using the Training Assessment Model (TAM).
➤ **Execute and structure UMTS that results in a value-added training event that tangibly demonstrates the client unit's increased task proficiency.**
➤ **Teach, coach, and mentor a unit in training management to include Mission-Essential Task List (METL) and Yearly Training Plan (YTP) development.**

ENDSTATE: Export O/C-T packages to provide exercise and training support to client units. Client units will receive a "TRAINED" assessment for their pre-mobilization sets and continue to sustain proficiency in those tasks. Client units are postured to rapidly transition to post-mobilization requirements based on theater-specific tasks.

BATTALION METL

➤ **Plan, coordinate and execute lane training and provide feedback.**
➤ **Train, certify and sustain O/C-T proficiency.**
➤ **Provide UMTS to designated RC units.**

COMMON O/C-T FUNCTIONS

Control and Observe Training. Controlling training does not mean leading the unit; it refers to ensuring the unit understands and follows the exercise Rules of Engagement (EXROE). Assessing casualties and reporting unit activities are important aspects of controlling. Observing training requires the O/C-T to be where the action is; observing key events and activities with a skilled eye ensures the feedback provided to the unit in take-home packets (THPs) and AARs is accurate. O/C-Ts must not compromise the unit by their actions while observing; they should maintain a lower profile than the unit.

Provide Feedback and Conduct AARs. The feedback is provided through the comments made during AARs, in the THPs, and during the exercise. The daily one-on-one discussions with the RC units are extremely beneficial. O/C-T input is necessary for a quality AAR.

Monitor Safety. Conducting safe training is everyone's responsibility. The RC combat unit looks for the O/C-T to set the example. The O/C-T must prepare a risk assessment and compare it with that of the evaluated unit's chain of command.

O/C-T STANDARDS

➤ **When in charge, TAKE CHARGE!** An O/C-T is invisible,but always in control. He must be where he can observe and control. An O/C-T will not compromise the BLUEFOR or OPFOR unit or its location.

➤ **An O/C-T is committed to providing the most realistic training to the player unit.** Realism is important; enforce it vigorously. "Dead" soldiers do not put themselves on evacuation vehicles or dig their own graves. Ensure casualties are treated IAW EXROE. Do not identify OPFOR leader casualties for the unit; permit the unit to make the determination.

➤ **An O/C-T does not influence the battle through subjective decisions based on emotion, but rather, through both subjective and objective evaluations embedded in the spirit of the EXROE, doctrine, and common sense.**

➤ **An O/C-T is only responsible for understanding and enforcing the EXROE.**

➤ **Use of the controller gun is only to enforce and follow IAW EXROE.**

➤ **An O/C-T is obviously an expert in his field, but never pompous, overbearing, vacillating, obnoxious or judgmental.** We have all walked in these boots. The RC unit sees all O/C-Ts as experts, even if it is the O/C-Ts first rotation. Be prepared by knowing EXROE and doctrine from the Mission Training Plans (MTPs) and accepted tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

➤ **An O/C-T must know what the unit leader is thinking and why the unit is doing whatever it is doing.** O/C-T will never guess or assume; but must ask point blank questions if necessary. An O/C-T must understand the unit leader's reasoning to judge BLUEFOR actions. Do not lead the unit. Note when unit keys on O/C-T for AAR comment.

➤ **O/C-Ts must explain everything to the RC unit in tactical terms.**

➤ **An O/C-T will always ensure his vehicle is properly marked with a white triangle (approx. 9 inches per side) with "O/C-T" and the O/C-T call sign, a red light or red chemlight on front and back, and GLINT tape on top.** Combat-park O/C-T vehicles in a concealed position.

➤ **Do not update the unit on the BDA, except in AARs.**

➤ **Do not assist but, instead, coach the unit in tactical decisions.** Emergency and safety situations which require O/C-T assistance are exceptions.

➤ **An O/C-T maintains high safety standards and enforces them.**

➤ **O/C-Ts will prevent pyrotechnics from being expended after ENDEX - NO MAD MINUTE.** Intervene with RC unit or OPFOR chain of command if necessary.

➤ **An O/C-T will not consume food or beverage with or around the player unit.**

➤ **An O/C-T uses proper RTO procedures, and guards against being overheard by player and OPFOR units; keeps the volume down and whispers at night.** Stay on the net. Use radio discipline; state the facts, be professional, avoid sarcasm, and eliminate extraneous language. Be advised-- many people listen in on the net.

➤ **An O/C-T always exercises noise and light discipline and polices the training area aggressively.**

➤ **An O/C-T understands and conforms to Army doctrine.**

➤ **An O/C-T will never argue with the RC unit or OPFOR personnel.** When a decision is made, it is final.

➤ **Report, correct, and follow up on EXROE violations.**

➤ **An O/C-T will never show how he feels about a particular unit or individual action through gesture or demeanor.**

➤ **An O/C-T must know the terrain, learn the road network, trails, O/C-T landmarks, and reconnaissance sites for LZs and Dzs.** O/C-Ts must carry a map and overlay of unit boundaries and the approved exercise maneuver box -- maintain your orientation.

➤ **An O/C-T who drives a vehicle must be licensed on that vehicle and complete a daily PMCS.** The O/C-T must drive with the taillights on during daylight hours.

➤ **An O/C-T deploys with all serviceable equipment, properly marked and worn to O/C-T standard.** LCE will be buckled. O/C-Ts will remain in uniform while driving and will not display unauthorized items.

➤ **An O/C-T maintains high standards in personal appearance.** Haircuts and mustaches will conform to Army standards; uniforms will be serviceable. O/C-Ts will shave daily and will camouflage throughout the day as needed.

OBSERVER/CONTROLLER-TRAINER COMMANDMENTS

➤ **Always exercise common sense and good judgment.**
➤ **Know, understand, and enforce the EXROE.**
➤ **Be an expert in your field and doctrinally correct.** When in doubt, check with higher.
➤ **Maintain high standards of personal appearance and conduct.**
➤ **Be a MILES expert and enforce MILES procedures.**
➤ **Know the safety standards and enforce them; soldier welfare and safety are paramount.**
➤ **Never talk about unit performance or individual proficiency with a member of the training unit's chain of command or any person who does not "need to know."** Do not compare units.
➤ **Prepare, rehearse, and conduct AARs which are professional and doctrinally correct.**
➤ **Use and reinforce the unit chain of command.** Only take charge when ROE safety violations occur, when life, limb, or eyesight are threatened, or the chain of command requires assistance.
➤ **React to contacts and go where the action is.**

HOW THE 1-174TH GETS THE JOB DONE

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

Observer/Controller-Trainer (O/C-T) Certification Program, 174th Infantry Brigade. The O/C-T certification program is an internal program conducted at brigade and battalion levels. The program maintains 10 percent of CTC O/C academy graduates to ensure that personnel are current on O/C methods. The NCOs are also subjected to a Mobile Training Team (MTT) at Fort Drum administered by the Infantry Training Center at Fort Benning, GA. NCOs must prove their knowledge in basic and advanced Infantry tactics through the Infantry Tactics Certification Course and a yearly examination. The Battle Staff NCO Course for NCOs in 2S slots (designator for Battle Staff Course completion) gives NCOs the flexibility to "BE, KNOW, and DO" in both tactics and all levels of operations during evaluations. The Combat Lifesaver Course is required for each O/C-T in the battalion to ensure that medical assistance is readily available. Total Quality Management Awareness Courses are also provided through 1st Army for each O/C-T. The courses provide systems for total quality in all training. These are essential tools available to the success of the unit in increasing the training readiness and overall combat effectiveness of Reserve Component units. The unit's credibility for providing accurate and honest evaluations depends primarily on the competency and professionalism of O/C-Ts and in the performance of their duties. The unit's O/C-Ts must have a thorough understanding of training management, troop-leading procedures and methodology (how we train), and must be experts in warfighting doctrine. The O/C-T certification program consists of two phases.

(1) Phase I, Core Training: This is the heart of the O/C-T training program. A majority of the instruction focuses on providing the soldier with requisite skills and knowledge associated with observer/controlling duties. During Phase I, a number of classes are provided, including: range certification, driver's training, MILES certification, communication instructions and programming, Rules of Engagement (ROE) classes, Training Assessment Model (TAM) class, conducting the after-action review (AAR), and understanding troop-leading procedures.

(2) Phase Ia, Combat Training Center Observer/Controller Academy: This training is conducted at the CTCs for a minimum of 10 percent of the O/C-Ts. The remainder of the O/C-Ts complete a home-station right-seat ride certification lesson plan that allows the O/C-T to shadow and observe a fully qualified O/C-T and conduct an AAR after a training event. Only after successfully completing this phase does the O/C-T move on to Phase II.

(3) Phase II, Sustainment Training/Tactical Proficiency: The objective of this phase is to master proficiency on those selected tasks that are executed on lanes during Annual Training (AT) events. This training is conducted throughout the training year and is included in NCODP and OPD programs. These are very important programs in the battalion and are used to maintain technical and tactical proficiency. The battalion commander certifies the lane. Recertification is conducted throughout the year to keep the skills at a high level of readiness

THE AFTER-ACTION REVIEW (AAR)

An AAR is an analysis of performance; it provides soldiers and units feedback on mission and task accomplishment. AARs identify how to correct shortcomings and sustain strengths; they serve as a leadership development tool. The art of conducting the AAR is mastered only through years of experience and training. Practice and critique are vital in producing good results. The AAR is conducted at the conclusion of a pure lane or at appropriate points during integrated lanes.

THE TAKE-HOME PACKAGE (THP)

The Task Summary Sheets from the MTPs, along with the executive summary and soldiers skills assessment, are provided to the battalion CDR, BN S3, XO, and CSM. Each company commander, XO, and 1SG are provided tasks summary sheets that are pertinent to their mission. This provides an excellent tool for the commander and his staff for the following year's training. The focus is "cause and effect" provided in the narrative comments on the Task Summary Sheet. Training (T), Needs Practice (P), and Untrained (U) are methods to measure the units effectiveness during the Battle Drill. Leader Task Proficiency, along with Individual Task Proficiency, are also recorded. A casualty report is provided for both friendly and opposing forces. When fratricide occurs, a red flag is displayed. The circumstances surrounding the incident are stressed forcefully during the AAR and THP.

TALK THE TALK, AND WALK THE WALK

The O/C-T is a trainer and troop leader who is fully qualified in his duty MOS and has proven his worth by meeting all required screening and selection processes done by Infantry Branch. The O/C-T lives by, fully understands, integrates, and practices the new Army Values (LDRSHIP) on a daily basis. O/C-Ts of the battalion are team players, competent, professional, hard working, and maintain the highest standards. This is a unique assignment with excellent potential for advancement in the Infantry field. There is a mandatory three-year tour for NCOs and a two-year tour for officers with many challenges and professional opportunities in the assignment. The O/C-T must live by the high standard and "stand tall" in the position the Army leadership has placed on him. Request their assistance as they return to TO&E units and prepare for duties of increased responsibility. Take advantage of what they can offer.✪



"NCOs Lead the Way."

Conducting Vehicle Searches in Peace Operations

by MAJ James E. Hutton, Military Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned

INTRODUCTION

Prosecuting peace operations entails frequent contact with non-combatants each of whom may present a threat to the force. Protecting the force is a requisite for all operations. One of the many tasks in a peace operation is the conduct of vehicle searches.

This article provides steps for performing vehicle searches and planning and training considerations for units involved in the process. This article is not the definitive source document for vehicle searches. Use this article along with other texts and theater-specific documents to assist in plan development.

The first section defines the terms and the functions of the soldiers executing the searches. After defining the terms and functions in the process, the focus shifts to the techniques required to complete a search. Use the techniques described in this document to create training plans for search teams. The final section details considerations for planning searches and developing search-team drills.

Searching vehicles is a critical task for protecting the force in peace operations. A single vehicle equipped with explosives can cause massive damage and bodily harm. The role of each team member is as important as the next. We must ensure leaders and soldiers can perform this vital mission.

ROLES AND TERMS[1]

Each team member must clearly understand not only his role, but also the role of every member of the team. Use the definitions below to organize the team:

Officer in Charge (OIC) or Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC). The OIC or NCOIC provides overall supervision to the team. He is not positioned in any established area and is free to move about as necessary to oversee the operation.

Search Team. The team usually consists of two personnel. One person conducts interior searches, and the other performs exterior searches. Both searchers remain unarmed throughout the operation because of their close proximity to the driver.

Observer. The observer watches for unusual activities or occurrences. He provides the team with early warning of danger. He is armed and is prepared to engage potential enemies in accordance with the plan.

Security Team. Four soldiers make up the security team. This armed team is positioned with one member near each corner of the vehicle. Team members can provide the use of deadly force commensurate with the local Rules of Engagement (ROE). One team member, and potentially more, may be required to provide overwatch of passengers (see techniques on page 18).

Prohibited Items (PIs). PIs are determined by regulation, policy, statute or directive. The list(s) of PIs may vary in content from theater to theater.

Host-Nation Authorities (HNAs). The HNAs usually work in cooperation with U.S. or allied nations. Knowledge of procedures of HNAs is important for administering violations discovered in searches.

[1] This list was derived in part from lesson plans presented at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, GE.

SEARCH TECHNIQUES

Vehicle searches consist of three phases: **1. Removal of the driver, 2. Search of the exterior of the vehicle, and 3. Search of the interior of the vehicle.** Searchers examine the vehicle for PIs. They look closely for unusual or out-of-place items as resolved by theater-specific directives.



(U.S. Army Photo)

Figure 1. Team Positioning

Step 1. After a vehicle is identified as requiring a search, the interior searcher instructs the driver of the vehicle to slowly move it to a pre-designated search area. The area should provide blast protection for the surrounding area. In the search area, the complete team takes its position (see Figure 1).

Step 2. When the vehicle has stopped, the interior searcher instructs the driver to turn the vehicle off and slowly hand the keys to the *exterior* searcher. The interior searcher then directs the driver to slowly open the driver's side door and exit the vehicle. If there are other passengers, he requires them to exit the vehicle one at a time after the driver has exited. The interior searcher conducts personnel searches of the driver and passengers (personnel searches are not discussed in this article). He moves the other passengers to the rear of the vehicle and requires a security team member to maintain eyes-on contact at all times. He ensure the passengers' hands are visible throughout the search. The interior searcher then directs the driver to a position to the rear left of the vehicle and remains with him.

Step 3. The exterior searcher examines the vehicle. He looks at the top of the vehicle, the rear, the left side, hood and front grill, light fixtures, and the right side. He then uses a mirror (see Figure 2) to examine the undercarriage and wheel wells.

(U.S. Air Force Photo)

Figure 2. Airman Searches Exterior

Step 4. The exterior searcher notifies the interior searcher that the exterior search is complete. The interior searcher then escorts the driver to the hood of the vehicle and instructs him to open it. Once opened, the interior searcher moves the driver away from the vehicle and the exterior searcher examines the engine block, carefully avoiding direct contact. (Note: For exterior compartments, such as the gas cap area, require the driver to open the compartment for inspection.)

Step 5. Upon completion of the engine block check, the interior searcher instructs the driver to open the passenger side door(s). He then instructs him to open the trunk (and any other driver's side doors).

Step 6. The interior searcher instructs the driver to begin the interior search by placing his hands over the wrists of the driver. He directs the driver to slowly rub over the insides of the doors, seats (front and back), the ceiling, battery box (if in cab), open the glove compartment, and pass his hands over (touching) the floor carpeting. This process is repeated through each door entry as required to cover the complete interior.

Step 7. The interior searcher escorts the driver to the trunk. With trunk previously opened, he requires the driver to slowly remove any loose items. (Note: If the spare tire well is in the trunk, require the driver to remove the tire to examine the well.) The interior searcher maintains control of the driver by placing his hands over the wrists of the driver as in Step 6.

Step 8. Upon completion of the search, the interior searcher instructs the driver to slowly place any materials removed back into the original position, and close all doors (except the driver's door), exterior compartments, the trunk and the hood.

Step 9. The interior searcher directs the driver to re-enter his car. The exterior searcher returns the keys to the driver and instructs the driver to move his vehicle out of the search area and through the gate (or checkpoint). The security team moves along with the vehicle until it has cleared the search area.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

In peace operations, each situation has unique features. The following planning factors, however, can enhance the planning process if adequately addressed. Consider the following factors to develop an appropriate search plan.

- **Legal Restrictions.** The Staff Judge Advocate must develop search restriction guidelines. Include detainment restrictions.
- **Threat Level and Terrorist Activity.**
- **Weather.** Driver's clothing and likely items found in vehicles may have seasonal changes.
- **Actions Upon Discovery of PI.** Any search plan must fully address what to do in the event of discovery of such items. What does the search team do with the driver and passengers? The vehicle? Who is to be notified? Disposition of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), weapons and other dangerous objects?
- **Host-Nation Authority (HNA) Support.**
- **Available Fire Support.**
- **Female/Male Searchers.** (If personnel searches are also required, conduct same-gender searches, if possible).
- **Rules of Engagement.**
- **Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Threat.**
- **Availability of Interpreters.**
- **Day/Night Procedures.**
- **Medical Activity Availability.**

CONCLUSION

Executing vehicle searches is an essential skill for forces conducting peace operations. Teams must hone their skills in conducting searches through the use of carefully planned drills. Leaders plan the operation and ensure team members understand the roles of each team member. Plans must account for all thoughtful possibilities and be rehearsed repeatedly. Protecting the force will enable it to conduct operations and accomplish the mission. Protecting soldiers is our highest priority. ***Train the force for victory!***✪

ANNEX 1
VEHICLE SEARCH

1. Organize search teams:

- **OIC/NCOIC:** Overwatches the search.
- **Search Team:**
  - ➤ **One searches exterior.**
  - ➤ **One searches interior.**
- **Observer:** Provides early warning
- **Security Team:** Four positions covering 360 degrees.
  (1) L/F bumper – R/F bumper
  (2) R/F bumper – R/R fender
  (3) R/R bumper – L/R bumper
  (4) L/R fender – L/F fender

2. Search Exterior of Vehicle (Require driver to open compartments):

- ➤ **L/F fender well/behind wheel.**
- ➤ **Under/behind front bumper/grill.**
- ➤ **Engine Compartment.**
- ➤ **R/F fender well/behind wheel.**
- ➤ **Under R/S from front – back.**
- ➤ **R/R fender well/behind wheel.**
- ➤ **Under/behind rear bumper.**
- ➤ **Trunk (if any).**
- ➤ **L/R fender well/behind wheel.**
- ➤ **Under L/S from back – front.**
- ➤ **Top of vehicle.**

3. Search Interior of Vehicle (Require driver remove excess cargo):

- ➤ **Behind and under seats.**
- ➤ **Under the dashboard.**
- ➤ **Glove and tool compartment.**
- ➤ **Battery box.**
- ➤ **Above the sun visor.**
- ➤ **Cab's ceiling/padded roof.**
- ➤ **False floors.**
- ➤ **Spare tire well.**

First Sergeant Duty

What is expected of you, and what you can do to prepare for it!

by MSG Bertram F. Vaughan, Bn Op NCOIC,
1-174th Inf Bde, Fort Drum, NY

Introduction

The role of the first sergeant in the U. S. Army is one that is time-honored and rich in custom and tradition. The assumption of first sergeant duty is a job that bears no comparison. The duties of the first sergeant are so varied that it would be difficult to include all aspects of the position under one title.

The primary duties of the first sergeant have changed very little since the days of the Revolution. General von Steuben described the duties of the first sergeant as:

1) **Enforce discipline and encourage duty among troops.**
2) **Maintain the duty roster.**
3) **Keep the company descriptive book which lists the name, age, height, place of birth, and prior occupation of every enlisted man in the unit.** (Today, this book would be known as a "Leader Book.")

Today, first sergeants must accomplish all of the aforementioned plus have a high level of competency, energy, motivation, and be able to communicate effectively. The first sergeant promotes enlisted welfare, morale, and health issues and assists the commander in maintaining discipline, standards of conduct, and provides guidance on matters of leadership, military justice, customs and courtesies. Above all, a first sergeant must be exemplary in professional conduct and appearance.

Duties

1) **Support the command sergeant major.**
2) **Handle all soldier problems, and keep the commander informed.**
3) **Ensure instructions are followed, and tasks are completed.**

Expectations

Although the Department of the Army assigns E8s to units, the commander and the command sergeant major decide who will be first sergeants. After interviewing numerous commanders and command sergeants major,* the following list of expectations of first sergeants emerged:

1) **Desire and motivation:** The individual must want to be a first sergeant or he may prove to be a detriment to the unit.
2) **Integrity:** Integrity must be beyond reproach. Commanders and soldiers must be able to trust the first sergeant and know that if they have to talk to the first sergeant, they can.
3) **Leadership:** A strong first sergeant serves as a good mentor. Soldiers will want to emulate the first sergeant if he or she is "Leading the Way." The first sergeant must make time to share experiences with young leaders to help them become exceptional noncommissioned officers.

***Acknowledgement:** The following individuals were interviewed for information to support this article: LTC Haggins, MAJ Lumpkins, CSM Covington, CSM Kamanski (Ret), CSM McKinney, and MSG Feazelle.

4) **Dedication to duty:** The first sergeant must develop a system to ensure that all missions are accomplished. This may mean beginning before the duty day and continuing to work long after the duty day ends. The first sergeant must also check on training to ensure that the commander's intent is being met.

5) **Tactical knowledge:** No longer are there "field first sergeants" or "field soldiers," just soldiers. Field training actually begins in the garrison area and determines your success in the field, i.e., Sergeants' Time Training. In the field, the first sergeant must be able to spot-check positions or maneuver with an element to strengthen the leadership.

6) **Counseling development:** The first sergeant must teach platoon sergeants how to perform their job well and how to develop their subordinate non-commissioned officers.

7) **Knowledge of rules:** The job of the first sergeant is multi-faceted and complex. Regulations change often, and first sergeants must stay abreast of the updates.

8) **Ability to speak:** The first sergeant is the company's senior enlisted advisor and must be able to speak to the commander on the behalf of all soldiers. Then the commander will be able to make decisions that will benefit the soldiers or the mission.

9) **Standard setter:** When soldiers see the first sergeant doing physical training, they push themselves to accomplish more. The first sergeant must lead from the front and set the standard not only in uniform appearance and on the Army Physical Fitness Training, but also in off duty conduct as well. Upholding the seven Army values of *loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage* is essential to unit cohesion.

10) **Time management:** Develop a schedule. Budget your time to check all correspondence (electronic and paper), but do not sit all day at your desk. Check on your soldiers and the unit daily operations, and allow time for command sergeant major and first sergeant meetings.

11) **UCMJ:** Do what you know is right, and make the appropriate recommendation for punishment.

Preparation

A first sergeant needs the total support from the family. If your spouse does not desire to be awakened in the evening when the phone rings, this job is not for you! This position demands more time away from the family. Along with normal duty hours, the first sergeant is "on call" 24 hours a day and should expect long and irregular duty hours.

If you are motivated by the challenge of personal and professional managerial growth, being a first sergeant is the job for you. If you are willing to deal with people, issues, and refine your counseling skills, this is the job for you. If you are willing to work case after case of negative issues, only to help and occasionally make a difference with that one individual, this is the job for you. These types of intrinsic rewards will carry you through and give you what it takes to be a first sergeant.

A 35-day First Sergeant Course is offered at Ft. Bliss, TX, under the auspices of The United States Army Sergeants Major Academy. This course is quite fast-paced and is designed for first-time first sergeants. To further assist you to prepare, several installations offer a five-day Commander and First Sergeant Orientation Course for familiarization with the local policies and procedures.

Conclusion

This article is not all-inclusive. However, it does provide some key points that can be used to assist in accomplishing a number of requirements involved with first sergeant duties. Remember, some lessons can be provided by the command sergeant major while other lessons are learned through day-to-day experience with the troops.✪

It's a dirty business, but somebody has to do it. *(URBAN COMBAT)*

by Mr. George J. Mordica II, CALL Military Analyst

Since the Middle Ages, urban combat has been a dirty business. The effect on the populace has always been traumatic, whether the people were participants or simply bystanders caught in the misery of it all. In earlier times, laying siege to a city and then taking it was the objective. Since World War II and the refinement of maneuver warfare, cities have become a restricted area that are more easily bypassed or reduced than taken. Part of the reason for this gradual change in strategy has been the cost associated with military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT). The cost, although difficult to calculate, has been excessive and prohibitive.

Recent examples of urban combat, such as the Russian attempt and eventual success in Grozny (the capital of the Republic of Chechnya), demonstrate the current price of fighting under these conditions. This Russian operation was conducted unconstrained by some of the modern-day concerns such as civilian casualties or collateral damage. Yet, the operation demonstrated that urban combat is demoralizing, resource draining, politically costly, and represents the least favorable option of driving the enemy out. More favorable strategies in taking a city include: cutting off the city from enemy reinforcement and supply, thereby letting the defenders collapse; reducing the city by armed force; or bypassing the city altogether and winning the war by other means. Some disadvantages in conducting urban combat are the loss of maneuver space and communications and the loss of any technological edge that U.S. forces possess. Although technology can be put to good use in this type of warfare, the loss in overall advantage seems to outweigh the gain.

This article discusses the dangers of entering into urban combat operations unprepared. The Russians experienced a hard lesson at Grozny, a lesson the United States had experienced in earlier times on a large scale at Aachen, Manila, Hue and Panama, and recently on a smaller scale in Mogadishu: that urban combat operations are not and cannot be clinical operations.

This article also attempts to form a baseline of knowledge gathered through years of studying military history, from someone who is not an expert in urban combat operations. The thoughts discussed here are the result of reading historical literature, reviewing recent events in the world, and monitoring trends gathered from the various U.S. Army training centers. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is attempting to observe lessons learned from MOUT that may help our soldiers in a future urban combat contingency. There are concerns by some junior leaders, voiced at the JRTC, that our soldiers are not being properly trained, equipped, supplied, and led to meet the challenges of urban combat operations.

★★★

OBSERVATION: U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areas is outdated.

DISCUSSION: The primary U.S. Army doctrinal publication on this subject, **FM 90-10, *Military Operations on Urban Terrain*** (a prescription on how the Army plans to fight in the urban environment), was published 15 August 1979. Its focus was on the fast-moving European battlefield of the 1960s, and 1970s. An update specifically designed to provide the "how-to pieces of urban combat" was addressed in **FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas,*** published in May 1993, with the subsequent Change 1, 3 October 1995. Change 1 provided some lessons learned from the Army's Panama, Haitian, and Somalia experience. The potential threats described in both of these publications have changed the weapons and munitions in our own inventory, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). In addition, the technology present on the battlefields of the world has dramatically changed. The types and locales of cities as well as the political and environmental limitations, city sizes, population densities, and changes in demographics in areas where the Army may be committed need review. The equipment available to the regular infantry for executing doctrine is outdated. Moreover, the training we are using to prepare our soldiers for urban combat is not realistic enough to present the full spectrum of command and control, along with the psychological impact, close combat, and logistical problems associated with this type of combat.

RECOMMENDATION: TTP need to be developed as an interim measure until doctrine can be written that supports urban combat. A new publication, MCWP 3-35.3, *Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain,* published 16 April 1998 by the United States Marine Corps and the Marine Corps' current "Urban Warrior" experiment are positive steps which offer a different approach and fresh

review of many of the questions the Army needs to address. The Marines are conducting "Urban Warrior" over a two-year period to develop TTP and long-range, over-the-horizon command and control capabilities. An Army experiment called the MOUT TF originated at the Department of the Army and was tasked to TRADOC. This effort was then tasked by TRADOC to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA. Its mission is to determine what should be done about the outdated FM 90-10/90-10-1 and to develop a training strategy for urban combat in the Army. Another interesting project at Fort Benning is the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). This project is a joint venture with the Marine Corps and is providing some encouraging work focused on what technology can bring to the urban fight.

★★★

OBSERVATION: The political realities of urban combat have created a terminology that tends to place limitations on how to conduct these operations. Terms, such as surgical MOUT, precision MOUT and high-intensity MOUT, are attempts at making urban combat something that it is not.

DISCUSSION: These terms tend to bring civility to urban combat operations. Based again on historical research and examples of how urban combat is fought, there is no method for this type of operation. The distinctions between one phase of urban combat and the others are not precise. The different types of urban combat descriptions give our soldiers and leaders a false sense of security that the operation they are conducting will not escalate; they do not plan thoroughly for such contingencies.

RECOMMENDATION: It is important that doctrine writers and soldiers who develop TTP currently being practiced use the correct terminology in describing the details and actions necessary in urban combat. The sugar-coated version of urban combat will not reflect the truth. Battles in a city are savage, and many times do not allow for the precautions normally taken in the field concerning refugees, civilian casualties, evacuation of friendly and enemy wounded and dead, and prisoners of war (POWs). The intent here is not to desensitize our soldiers to the plight of civilians or friendly and enemy soldiers, but to caution everyone that conventional concerns on the open battlefield may not apply in urban combat. Does this mean the Army cannot hold itself to a high moral code - NO? However, it does mean there is a need to be prepared for a situation where beliefs, moral code, and practices are tested beyond the bounds of current training, and to be prepared to face those challenges on a case-by-case basis.

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OBSERVATION: The manpower resources needed to conduct urban combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under the current downsizing agenda, the Army does not have the soldiers to do the job. Any urban operation requires the infantryman, and many of them, not only to clear buildings and fight the fight, one room at a time, but also to secure buildings already taken, and to guard precarious lines of communication that can be cut by a determined enemy squad. In an urban battle today, the battle for a building may take U.S. forces 24 stories straight up. Battle space cannot be considered in ground area in urban combat.

DISCUSSION: A battle fought under these conditions lessens all the advantages the U.S. military possesses on the open battlefield and requires that soldiers, not machines, fight and die for every corner, set of stairs, soda machine, and hallway. The grim reaper will collect his due, no matter what devices can be developed to improve our advantage. There are just too many corners, stairs, vending machines, and hallways along the way. To anticipate few casualties in this type of operation would not be an honest appraisal.

RECOMMENDATION: The Army needs soldiers in sufficient numbers to fight and support the urban battle, and provide service support to those soldiers committed to the urban battle. A streamlined combat organization is needed that allows for easier task organization. A standard organization in combat arms units will help. Infantry units should be organized the same whether they are light infantry, airborne infantry, air assault infantry, ranger infantry, or mechanized infantry. Specialty, in organization, creates unnecessary problems in equipment, weapons, ammunition, and support. The Army in its currently reduced state does not need organizational problems complicated by one-of-a-kind and uniquely organized subordinate organizations. The "keep it simple, stupid" (KISS) principle applies here, where "one organization fits all" is the best approach, then organize for combat.

Recently, the Chief of Infantry addressed this last problem. He recognized the problem in the field and reacted to "quick-fix" the organizational problem. The doctrinal development in organization will follow and unit training will adjust to the changes over time. The changes will define the basic unit of infantry and lead to its development in the task organization for combat, whether in the urban environment, in the jungle or desert.

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OBSERVATION: Training in villages will not prepare the Army for combat in the large metropolitan areas. The Army has invested a tremendous amount of money and assets in developing a series of first-class MOUT sites at various training centers to help train soldiers to operate in the urban combat environment.

DISCUSSION: These sites can help a soldier polish the skills he needs to clear a room, isolate a threat, or move up a stairwell, but the present training sites are unrealistic. They suggest the urban terrain can be isolated and cut off. Only in the best of circumstances would this be the case. Cities are too large and too segmented to allow for complete encirclement, and forces are not available to accomplish this task. As in Grosny, the enemy will be reinforced and supplied with open-ended support. Gone are the days when an army can prevent these enemy activities in an urban battle. Even the best weapons in the world cannot isolate the enemy; the example of the Ho Chi Minh trail should tell all military practitioners something. If the enemy is dedicated to his cause, re-arming, re-supply, and reinforcement will be something for which our forces must contend and for which they must be prepared.

RECOMMENDATION: The U.S. Army needs to work with city governments to train under as realistic conditions as acceptable to those cities. Offers of cooperation, funding, and sharing of experiences that could otherwise never be gained with local law enforcement agencies and other emergency services can create an exercise that will benefit all concerned.

OBSERVATION: U.S. forces currently do not have the special weapons needed and lack the quantities necessary for urban operations. The weapons historically needed to do the job are in many cases either not in the inventory or soldiers are not available for training in the urban environment.

DISCUSSION: In our world today, the concern of what weapon is appropriate for the incident may impact on our ability to fight successfully in urban combat. The enemy can use whatever ruthless means he has at his fingertips to engage our forces, yet due to the prevailing attitude with our image, the press, and concern for the local population, the Army may be prevented from using the most effective weapons. In an historical example (Aachen), the use of 155-mm artillery in direct fire mode offered a tremendous equalizer, yet today, it would create unacceptable collateral damage. Another weapon consistently used in city combat is the flame-thrower. When faced with a bunker or basement where all the firepower in the world is available, yet not effective, it has historically been the flame-thrower that got the job done. This weapon, like no other, produces a tremendous amount of psychological effect on a trapped enemy, yet this weapon is not considered an acceptable substitute for firepower. The M202 Flash is the latest generation of flame weapon; however, few infantryman have trained with this weapon. At present, we are not sure the system is available to regular infantry. This weapon is much safer than the previous flame-thrower apparatus and also easier to train with and store. Why is this weapon, better described as a round (actually four tubes), not used in training or available in quantities necessary for urban combat? If safety is still an issue, technological improvements in binary weapons my help in the development of an advanced flame-thrower.

RECOMMENDATION: Develop weapons based on the need to defeat the threat, not on political considerations concerning whether such a weapon would be used in a given situation. The concerns for weapons "use" should be: 1.) Will it be effective? 2.) Is it safe for our troops to use? 3.) Will it have the desired effect? Finally, the weapon must be available in sufficient quantities for use in realistic training and for combat.

OBSERVATION: Quantity of supplies is another issue that the Army must be prepared to address in a urban combat situation. Previous evidence shows that urban combat uses an inordinate amount of supplies, from ammunition to bandages. This usage is in conventional supplies only. It does not account for specialty equipment, such as grappling hooks and rope (described as essential for every soldier), nor for the high use of fragmentation, white phosphorus, thermal, and smoke grenades necessary for every move.

DISCUSSION: A lack of sufficient supplies and specialty equipment will force our troops to use alternatives and "workarounds" to clear the enemy from certain positions. These workarounds will be applied with the loss of certain weapons from our inventory that may be considered unnecessary. Because these workaround weapons are not supported, they are not in the inventory and will not be available for training or available when needed for urban operations.

RECOMMENDATION: Screen weapons for use in the urban environment, and make weapons effectiveness, easy use, and safety (rather than political acceptability) priorities in determining needs.

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OBSERVATION: Munitions now in the inventory are not suitable for urban combat. In past wars, the types of ammunition in the inventory worked for all possibilities. Today, this is not the case. Because of the cost of maintaining ammunition stores and the doctrine that U.S. forces expect to employ, the ammunition is designed to emphasize high-speed maneuver battles (tank-on-tank, infantry fighting vehicle-on-infantry fighting vehicle), with little concern about the effects current types of ammunition will have in urban combat.

DISCUSSION: Armor-piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) rounds will not explode against masonry, and armor-piercing ammunition will not have the desired effect against brick and wood. The need for a greater selection of ammunition for all our weapons in urban combat is necessary. Infantry operations alone will not succeed. As demonstrated in previous engagements, indirect fires must be used to isolate strong points, and a combined arms team has the best chance of success. The destructive power of tanks, anti-tank, and direct fire artillery weapons can create a foothold in an enemy position that will allow the infantry to close with and destroy them. The ammunition currently in the inventory will not fit the bill. It is designed for a different type of warfare, and to assume it will do the job is a mistake.

RECOMMENDATION: A high level review of the ammunition necessary in urban combat must be conducted. The use of high-explosive, high-explosive plastic, white phosphorus, and flechete rounds need to evaluated and considered for reintroduction into the inventory in sufficient quantities for effective training. Satchel charges, explosives, and bangalore torpedoes should also be re-evaluated for use in urban conditions. There are numerous cities and towns abandoned along the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers because of the Corps of Engineers buyout in flood plain programs that could serve as perfect targets for experiments of different types of munitions and their effectiveness. Recently, a MOUT Conference was held at Fort Benning, GA, and members of CALL witnessed a demonstration of new munitions under consideration by the Infantry school for forced-entry in urban combat conditions. These promising munitions, each with its own unique capability, will go a long way in solving some age-old problems for infantrymen in urban combat. The next step is to obtain these munitions as soon as possible and provide them to the field, along with instruction and training devices that give our soldiers the tools needed to train.

Also a new type of multi-purpose tank ammunition for the 120mm gun is currently under development. Hopefully, this ammunition is being examined for a role in urban combat.

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***OBSERVATION**: Specialty communications equipment is now only available to special units. This communications equipment is needed now for regular infantry for training and potential combat operations.*

DISCUSSION: The communications equipment available over the counter in the U.S. can sustain a tactical squad of any police department in America in force-entry operations. Yet, the U.S. infantryman must rely on systems designed for the open battlefield. The right equipment for conducting urban combat is available, but if that equipment is on the shelf, it is not providing our soldiers with the tools they need to train

and fight in an urban combat contingency.

RECOMMENDATION: Communications problems that can occur during combat in a city environment must be detected and fixed during training *NOW*. These potential communications problems are not on-the-site problems; they represent a series of complex problems found only in a segmented urban battlefield with electronic interference, dead spots, and anomalies that hinder command and control. The U.S. Army must train with the equipment, weapons, communications, soldiers and leadership to develop the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) needed to win in urban combat.

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OBSERVATION: *Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated into urban combat training.*

DISCUSSION: The recent examples of chemical use in Tokyo by a terrorist group should have sent a shock wave throughout our military. This action makes the use of NBC operations in urban combat inevitable. The enemy our forces are likely to face will be technologically inferior, and, despite our best efforts, will attempt to negate our advantages in conventional weapons and combat operations. NBC represents a tremendous equalizer for any potential foe. The very terrain presented by a city begs the use of these potent weapons in isolated "no-win" skirmishes as the enemy tries to escape to fight again in the next block or around the next corner. Urban combat creates an opportunity to fight to allow separation and escape to fight again. In some cases, the sacrifice of forces, by the enemy, to create a catastrophic loss on an opponent will probably be a choice. The more friendly forces committed to a fight in a particular building allows a determined foe more options to use all the weapons at his disposal. One dreaded enemy option is to neutralize the building using NBC, and create catastrophic loss for U.S. forces.

RECOMMENDATION: The U.S. Army must take the threat of NBC in urban combat seriously. This threat is real and presents a dilemma to any force trying to conduct urban operations. The Army needs to conduct liaison operations with all related government and intelligence agencies to gain a better understanding of the threat and to incorporate that intelligence threat into urban combat scenarios, with other government agencies participating.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR TTP DEVELOPMENT

In the research effort necessary for this article and as the result of separate discussions with O/Cs in round-table discussions at the Joint Readiness Training Center, a number of recurring trends were identified. These trends are supported by observations submitted over time to CALL for inclusion in the CTC Trends publications published semi-annually. The recurring trends are listed below and grouped by the battlefield operating system (BOS).

☞ **INTELLIGENCE BOS: TA.5**

- The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is not specific enough for MOUT.
- Lack of a decision support template and timelines preparation hinder the planning process.
- There is limited intelligence focus on the routes to the objective.
- The force ratio analysis is rarely done, if done at all.
- Identification of key terrain and fields of fire is not effective.
- Intelligence gathering and development of input for the planning process are not complete.
- Use of psychological operations and civil affairs operations is not planned.
- Identification of decision points and setting conditions for success is not emphasized.
- Units fail to get eyes on the objective to confirm the intelligence template.
- Little care is given to collection from, and care of civilians on, the battlefield.

☞ **MANEUVER BOS: TA.1**

- The movement plan to the object is usually not done well.
- There is a lack of focus in the movement to the objective, resulting in significant casualties.
- Casualties in the movement prevent units from achieving mass on the objective.
- Units do not achieve mass at other decision points.
- There is a failure to isolate the objective and protect the force from counterattack.
- A lack of Combined Arms TTP for Armor, Aviation, Close Air Support for urban combat.
- Uncoordinated maneuver and overwatch are more common in the urban fight.
- An unclear doctrinal base confuses units about correct procedures for clearing rooms.
- Marksmanship at all levels is poor with the exception of some special operations units.
- There is confusion among units as how to delineate inside from outside battlespace.

☞ **FIRE SUPPORT BOS: TA.2**

- Use of restrictive Rules of Engagement and dealing with collateral damage and effects.
- Units have problems with allocation of resources and positioning of Fire Support assets.
- Units poorly use precision-guided munitions.
- Suppression of enemy air defense for assembly areas is poorly planned.
- Units do not use counter battery fires effectively in urban conditions.
- Q36s are not being effectively used against enemy mortars.

☞ **MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY BOS: TA.6**

- Unit movements to their objective is not done well.
- The plans do not properly allocate engineer resources for the urban fight.
- There is usually little unity of the engineer effort.
- Units are not effective in suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.
- Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.
- Lack of eyes on the objective (scouts/aviation) prevent identification of obstacles.

☞ **COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS: TA.4**

- There is a lack of synchronization across the BOSs.
- Units do not effectively locate their command and control nodes.
- Battalion taskforce is overloaded with requests from higher.
- Wargaming and course-of-action development for urban combat need work.
- Leaders are unsure how to effectively fight once in the city.
- Communications problems in urban conditions are a major challenge.
- Leaders at all levels have problems with Rules of Engagement and proportionality.
- There is poor use of Judge Advocate General in the brigade combat teams.
- The fight needs to be defined and clear to each unit level of responsibility.
- Units fail to get eyes on the objective (scouts/aviation) to shape the battle.
- Sniper teams are not properly used in planning nor considered eyes on the objective.
- Confirmation of intelligence template is denied when no one can observe the objective.

☞ **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS: TA.7**

- Allocation of assets to support the fight in the urban fight is poor.
- Resupply and casualty evacuation in the urban fight are not conducted well.
- Urban-specific supply items: ladders, knee and elbow pads, and ropes with grappling hooks.
- Units do not plan for urban combat and the high died of wounds rate.
- Speed, not haste, in the tempo of urban operations is the norm.

☞ **AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BOS: TA.3**

- There is a poor allocation of ADA assets to support the urban fight overall.
- Focusing of the right ADA assets at the proper place and time in the battle is poor.
- Attack aviation vulnerability in battle positions is not taken into consideration in the plan.

CONCLUSION

The world in which the Army will fight in the 21st century is even more politically complex and dangerous than just a few years ago. There is a dramatic increase in the lethality of weapons available to hostile elements. The United States must cope with advanced technologies that reinvent themselves in hours, days, and weeks. The Army now faces a dangerous world without a defined foe. The enemy is nebulous, and the Army is caught between a highly successful, but increasingly outmoded doctrine and the desire to prepare to meet future adversaries. Urban combat will be a small piece of any new doctrine. The Army cannot wait for the next revision of **FM 100-5, *Operations,*** to be completed. Possibly the best approach is to develop new TTP for future contingencies and conflicts now. Developing and formalizing the TTP may generate broader thought that will lead to the new doctrine.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is attempting to develop current TTP to provide a stopgap measure until doctrine is updated and distributed. This method requires the support and contributions of soldiers in the field. CALL is not a doctrine-writing organization. CALL has the mission to support the deployed unit, provide assistance to the follow-on unit, and provide the Army as a whole with the lessons learned from these experiences. These lessons in the form of TTP can be the first step in revising doctrine, or the first step in recognizing that the Army has a potential problem.

The Army, as an institution, needs to be straightforward in dealing with its leadership, its soldiers, and the American people in addressing these problems, and must begin NOW! Positive leadership is the key ingredient toward success of urban combat operations. The casualties, resource requirements, and collateral damage of urban combat are now and will always be unacceptable and will remain so unless the Army addresses this subject and prepares for this contingency. Ignoring urban combat simply leaves the American people to pay the butcher's bill.

The intent of this article is to inspire a healthy debate and dialogue that will eventually improve our readiness for urban combat. The question may arise as to the need for a specific urban combat doctrinal manual, or whether urban combat operations can be considered a combat condition. If this later approach on urban combat is accepted, then should urban combat be incorporated into field manuals as an appendix or annex or incorporated into the text to address the "how to fight doctrine" for each discipline within the U.S. Army? The problems discussed are real. Those who believe urban combat can be clinical are wrong. The hard truth about urban combat operations is that "it is a dirty business, but somebody has to do it."✪

For further information or to provide TTP for urban combat operations, contact Mr. George Mordica at commercial 913-684-9503, DSN 552-9503, or e-mail <mordicag@leav-emh1.army.mil>

Bridging a Doctrinal Gap
Movement to Contact
(The Approach-March Technique)

by MAJ Fred Johnson, S3 Operations, 1-174th Inf, Ft Drum, NY

If most Airborne, Air Assault, or Light Infantry Rifle Company Commanders were asked *why* an approach-march movement to contact (MTC) is conducted, they would probably answer in so many words that:

> ***The MTC is conducted when the enemy situation is vague. Contact is made with the smallest element possible. Once engaged with the enemy, contact is maintained until the enemy is destroyed or the friendly unit is instructed by higher to do otherwise. For an approach march, the company normally operates as a part of a battalion as either the advanced guard, main body, or the flank or rear guard.***

That answer would be right on the money. However, if the same commanders were asked *how* to conduct an individual company approach march (not as a part of a battalion), it is unlikely they could provide a definitive doctrinal answer. This is particularly true if they were referencing **FM 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company,*** as their only source of information. The reason is that company-level doctrine falls short in providing commanders with the framework to develop courses of action (COAs) for the approach march.

This article explains why MTC doctrine needs to be updated and provides a point of reference to infantry company commanders for the execution of the MTC, using the approach-march technique.

This problem with movement-to-contact doctrine was realized during two Army National Guard (ARNG) Inactive Duty Training (IDT) exercises that were conducted in New York and New Jersey. On two separate weekends, the Observer Controller and Trainers (O/C-T) from the 1-174th Infantry Training Support Battalion (TSBn) conducted lanes training and evaluated rifle companies on the approach march MTC. Unlike the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), Training Support O/C-Ts actually evaluate units and assess T (Trained), P (Needs Practice), and U (Untrained) based on unit performance. Evaluated units are given Task Summary Sheets (TSSs) that address training strengths and shortfalls in these hard-line terms. The TSS is supported by the Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs) found in the Mission Training Plans (MTPs). Units receive Ts and Ps, based generally on their level of proficiency in executing the task. However, units receive a U if they fail to execute a standard or critical task. To faithfully execute their mission, the O/C-Ts must be able to demonstrate where units fall short in meeting standards. This requires standards that are clear and definable, which is not the case with MTC training doctrine.

The standards for the company MTC are:

- **The company moves NLT the time specified in the order.**
- **The company makes contact with only one element, and the main body is not surprised by the enemy.**
- **Once the company makes contact, it maintains contact.**
- **The company destroys platoon and smaller elements and fixes companies larger than a platoon.**
- **The company maintains a sufficient fighting force capable of conducting further combat operations.**
- **The U.S. forces comply with the ROE. Collateral damage is limited.**

Now, here is the rub. The standards for the MTC are the same whether the unit is conducting an approach march or a search and attack. Clearly, there are differences in the two techniques. In fact, ARTEP 7-10 is generally clear in providing the procedures for a company search and attack. However, the problem with the approach march is highlighted in paragraph 5a. The commander directs the company to use the approach-march technique and:

- **Performs the mission assigned by the battalion.**
- **Advanced guard.**
- **Main body.**
- **Flank or rear guard.**

Other than task steps that address movement techniques and formations and actions on contact, that is all the information that is provided. It seems that doctrine suggests that companies only conduct MTC using the approach march as a part of a battalion. Reality in the field indicates otherwise. Whether at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) or at Fort Dix, NJ, companies conduct the approach march as a unit and not as a part of a battalion -- all the time.

This begs the question of where do company commanders go to find doctrinal direction on the execution of a company MTC (not as a part of a battalion) using the approach-march technique. Interestingly, commanders must use **FM 7-8,** ***The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,*** (page 2-55) to find any definitive guidance on the operation.

The experienced commander may have deduced that tactical prudence dictates a small unit of a squad or platoon be positioned forward to locate the enemy. Nevertheless, the luxury of such experience is not always afforded leaders. This is particularly the case for the commanders in the ARNG who only have 39 days a year to train. Sometimes their only alternative is doctrine.

The problem was clearly evident with the ARNG commanders at the IDTs who struggled with developing COAs for their approach-march MTC. In may cases, they chose a scheme of maneuver similar to a deliberate attack with platoons given the missions of assault and support by fire. The O/C-Ts had an even more difficult time convincing the commanders that they should adopt a COA similar to the one provided in FM 7-8 when the mission standards in ARTEP 7-10 MTP do not address such a company task organization.

Currently, FM 7-10 is being updated and hopefully the doctrinal shortfalls were recognized and are being corrected. In the meantime, company commanders should use the example provided in FM 7-8 as they develop standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the approach-march MTC. While it is questionable whether units should unilaterally adjust task standards until doctrine is updated, leaders must take into account the problems that have been identified. Finally, O/C-Ts must assume their mentor and trainer role more frequently when providing training support to units.✪